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Abstract
Multi-winner voting rules based on approval ballots have received increased
attention in recent years. In particular Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) and
its variants have been proposed. In this note, we show that the winning set
can be determined in polynomial time for two prominent and natural variants
of SAV. We thank Arkadii Slinko for suggesting these problems in a talk at the
Workshop on Challenges in Algorithmic Social Choice, Bad Belzig, October 11,
2014.
1. Introduction
Multi-winner voting rules based on approval ballots have received increased
attention in recent years [1, 5, 4, 6, 8]. A natural way is AV in which the
candidates with the highest number of approvals are selected. However AV is
not very good at representing diverse intetests and other rules based on approval
ballots have been devised. In particular Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV ) and
its variants have been proposed [3, 7]. We show that the winning set can be
computed in polynomial time for two prominent variants of SAV .
2. Approval-based rules
We consider the social choice setting there is a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}
and a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm}. Each agent i ∈ N expresses an
approval ballot Ai ⊂ C that represents the subset of candidates that he approves
of, yielding a set of approval ballots A = {A1, . . . , An}. Approval-based multi-
winner rules that take as input (C,A, k) and return the subset W ⊆ C of size
k that is the winning set. Some rules may not return a winning set of a specific
size and the size can vary from 1 to m. We consider the following rules.
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Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV ). SAV finds a set W ⊆ C of size k that
maximizes Sat(W ) =
∑
i∈N
|W∩Ai|
|Ai|
.
Constrained Satisfaction Approval Voting (CSAV ). CSAV finds a set W ⊆ C
that maximizes CSat(W ) =
∑
i∈N
|W∩Ai|
|W | .
Modified Satisfaction Approval Voting (MSAV ). MSAV finds a set W ⊆ C
that maximizes MSat(W ) =
∑
i∈N
|W∩Ai|
min(|Ai|,|W |)
.
In contrast to SAV , CSAV and MSAV coincide with AV for the case of
k = 1. In this sense, they can be considered as proper generalization of AV
for larger k. CSAV and MSAV can also be used to select a winning set of
a given size k by selecting a set of size k with the highest CSat and MSat
scores respectvely. Note that if the size of the winning set is not specified, then
whereas SAV gives the set of all candidates the highest score, CSAV andMSAV
may not give the set of all candidates the highest score. We consider both the
problem of computing the winning set of a particular size as well as the problem
of computing the winning set of any size.
3. Computational results
Aziz et al. [2] showed that SAV can be implemented in polynomial time. We
show that CSAV and MSAV winning set can also be computed in polynomial
time.
Proposition 1. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a set of
size k with the maximum CSat score.
Proof. Note that for |W | = k,
CSat(W ) =
∑
i∈N
|W ∩ Ai|
|W |
=
∑
c∈W
∑
i∈N,c∈Ai
1
k
where we say that
∑
i∈N,c∈Ai
1
k
is the CSat score of an individual candidate with
respect to set size k. Hence computing a winning set of size k is equivalent to
selecting k candidates with the highest CSat scores with respect to set size k.
Since the CSat score of a particular candidate can be computed in polynomial
time, a set of size k with the highest CSat score can be computed in polynomial
time by selecting k candidates with the highest CSat scores.
Proposition 2. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a set of
arbitrary size with the maximum CSat score.
Proof. For k = 1 to |C|, compute a k-set with the maximum CSat score. Identify
the k for which the k-set with the maximum CSat score has the maximum CSat
score among all ks. Return such a k-set.
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Proposition 3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a set of
size k with the maximum MSat score.
Proof. Note that for |W | = k,
MSat(W ) =
∑
i∈N
|W ∩ Ai|
min(|Ai|, |W |)
=
∑
i∈N
|W ∩Ai|
min(|Ai|, k)
=
∑
c∈W
∑
i∈N,c∈Ai
1
min(|Ai|, k)
where we say that
∑
i∈N,c∈Ai
1
min(|Ai|,k)
is the MSat score of an individual can-
didate with respect to set size k. Hence computing a winning set of size k is
equivalent to selecting k candidates with the highest MSat scores with respect
to set size k. Since the MSat score of a particular candidate can be computed in
polynomial time, a set of size k with the highest MSat score can be computed
in polynomial time by selecting k candidates with the highest MSat scores.
Proposition 4. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a set of
arbitrary size with the maximum MSat score.
Proof. For k = 1 to |C|, compute a k-set with the maximum MSat score. Iden-
tify the k for which the k-set with the maximum MSat score has the maximum
MSat score among all ks. Return such a k-set.
We see that just like the SAV , two prominent variants of SAV can computed
in polynomial time.
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